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ABSTRACT 
There is an increasing debate on whether creditors exert excessive power and influence 
through their DIP (Debtor-in-Possession) lending arrangements in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
process. DIP lenders often advance the priority of their prepetition claims as a reward for 
extending credit (through DIP financing) through roll-up or cross-collateralization provisions. As 
these provisions violate the general principle of equitable treatment among the same class in 
bankruptcy, they are viewed as products of excessive creditor control. Hence, the paper 
compares U.S. bankruptcy cases from 2009 to 2011 with roll-up or cross-collateralization 
provisions in their DIP arrangements to those without, focusing on the CEO turnover rate and the 
strictness of covenants as signals of creditor control. As companies with those provisions report 
higher CEO turnover rates and stricter covenants, it is concluded that DIP agreements with cross-
collateralization or roll-up signal greater creditor control than those without.  
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INTRODUCTION 
One of many common reasons why firms file for Chapter 11 is that they are suffering 
from operational difficulties, along with low liquidity. An important function in Chapter 11 is 
providing that liquidity during the reorganization process to help the troubled company recover 
in a timely and efficient manner. The bankruptcy court provides this liquidity through DIP 
(Debtor-In-Possession) financing. One important thing to note is that because DIP financing is so 
crucial to the bankrupt firm’s recovery, the DIP lender has immense negotiating leverage and 
usually demands lending arrangements that improve their economic position (often at the 
expense of other parties). However, recently these lending arrangements have come under more 
scrutiny as many people interpret them as products of excessive creditor control. Specifically, 
arrangements such as roll-up and cross-collateralization generate a lot of controversy as they are 
viewed as abusive practices of massive power and influence DIP lenders have.  
Roll-up and cross-collateralization provisions effectively serve the same purpose in that 
they favor the DIP lender’s prepetition claims over claims of other prepetition creditors. A roll-
up usually requires that the debtor draw on the DIP loan to pay off some or all of the lender’s 
prepetition claims. The DIP lender arranges DIP financing in a way that effectively pays off its 
prepetition debt, “rolling up” its prepetition debt. In other words, this essentially refinances the 
pre-bankruptcy debt with DIP debt, which greatly improves the prospects for repayment of the 
debt and further enhances the DIP lender’s significant influence over the process. A similar 
concept is cross-collateralization, where the debtor grants a security interest in otherwise 
unencumbered assets of the company for both prepetition and post-petition claims of the DIP 
lender. As a reward for extending credit, the DIP lender essentially takes the collateral – the 
same collateral that would otherwise be distributed among prepetition creditors equitably – and 
uses some of it to only improve its prepetition claims. Thus, roll-ups and cross-collateralization 
are controversial because they create potential conflicts with the general bankruptcy principle of 
equal treatment among the same class. The fact that Section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code does 
not expressly authorize these arrangements also doesn’t add to their legitimacy.  
Therefore, with economic incentives tied to the structure of DIP financing, there is an 
increasing debate on whether these arrangements are associated with excessive creditor control, 
who want to “milk” the company and abuse their power to maximize their benefits, not the 
firm’s long term value. Taking this concept as a springboard, I hope to examine this issue further 
in this paper by analyzing whether cross-collateralization and roll-up provisions are associated 
with creditor control, with empirical data of bankruptcy cases from 2009-2011.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are multiple papers that explore the theory behind DIP financing in Chapter 11. 
Many of them mention potential conflicts of interest between the DIP lender who benefits 
asymmetrically, other impaired creditors, and the debtor. Although not all of them produce 
constructive solutions, some develop insightful frameworks that can be used to understand the 
DIP financing dynamic.   
One of the most prominent experts, Triantis (1993), mentions how the desirability of the 
DIP financing depends on more than whether the return to the lender is competitive. Namely, it 
mentions that the distinguishment has become blurry between DIP lender’s anticipated returns 
from expected increases in the value of the debtor’s assets and the anticipated returns from 
transfers of wealth from prepetition claimants. Triantis argues that only desirable financing 
arrangements that promote optimal investment and asset deployment decisions should be 
allowed.  
It also mentions other factors such as judicial ambiguity when faced with arrangement 
details of vague importance. Generally, courts leave the conditions regarding DIP financing to 
the business judgment of the debtor. For example, when courts need to decide whether roll-up or 
cross-collateralization provisions in DIP financing are necessary, they reserve from making a 
strong objection since many times DIP financing is so necessary for the firm’s successful 
reorganization. Thus, the paper suggests that courts be aware of possibilities of unfair 
distribution of debtor’s assets, and exercise its discretion to only promote firm value maximizing 
investment decisions.   
Further exploring the potential conflicts of interest in the bankruptcy process, other 
papers analyze the extent of creditor control. According to Ayotte and Morrison (2007), contrary 
to common belief at the time, equity holders and managers are shown to have almost no control 
over the reorganization process. Instead, the paper finds that creditor control is pervasive, 
demonstrated by several, specific metrics. From a sample of large privately and publicly held 
businesses that filed Chapter 11 during 2001, 70 percent of CEOs were replaced in the two years 
before a bankruptcy filing, with some reorganization plans deviating from the absolute priority 
rule in value distribution. Also, senior lenders were observed to exercise significant control 
through strict covenants, such as line-item budgets, capital expenditure limits, EBITDA targets, 
and other financial covenants in DIP financing. Interestingly, although senior secured lenders 
usually exert significant control, junior creditors also filed objections in more than half of the 
cases, acting through a creditors’ committee. The paper concludes that pervasiveness of creditor 
control doesn’t eliminate the fundamental inefficiency of the bankruptcy process of resource 
allocation. 
Tung (2017) further examines the relationship between economic conditions and DIP 
loan terms. He finds that ordinary loan provisions like pricing and reporting covenants are 
sensitive to economic conditions. However, he also finds that provisions that are often justified 
as necessary to induce DIP lending, have no statistically meaningful relationship with economic 
conditions. Specifically, there is no obvious relationship between credit availability and the 
existence of roll-up. Tighter credit environments signal higher levels of concern, from banks and 
lenders, of the borrower’s ability to pay back due to macro factors. If lenders require stricter 
covenants or higher economics due to macro factors, it would be less likely due to internal 
creditor control factors. However, the existence of milestones – covenants that set specific 
deadlines for achieving important (usually operational) metrics – and roll-ups in DIP lending 
agreements were not correlated with pessimistic credit markets. Therefore, it might be possible 
that certain DIP lenders exert excessive control through these provisions, where economic 
conditions do not necessarily prompt them to do so. He concludes his paper by urging 
policymakers and judges to question if sweeteners in DIP lending arrangements are really 
necessary to induce lending.  
The general trend of re-thinking these provisions is also present outside of the academia. 
The American Bankruptcy Institute, a nonpartisan organization that assists congressional 
committees and legislative staff on issues related to insolvency, also observed the proliferation of 
these arrangements in DIP lending in its 2014 report of Chapter 11 practices. It sought to resolve 
differences in opinions regarding “the permissibility of cross-collateralization and roll-up 
provisions in post-petition financing activities,” acknowledging that there is an opportunity for 
“abuse” of these provisions.1 The Commission made several recommendations, including that 
extraordinary provisions such as roll-ups and cross-collateralization not be permitted in interim 
orders. Also, it recommended approving roll-ups only if the new money from the DIP loan 
comfortably exceeds the size of the roll-up, and the DIP loan at issue is the best available option 
and is in the best interests of the estate.  
Many researchers, along with ABI, have explored the extent of creditor control, and the 
idea and the dynamics of DIP lending, but no one has explicitly analyzed the extent of creditor 
control measured through these provisions such as cross-collateralization or roll-up. Taking the 
insight from Tung, that roll-ups are not correlated with economic conditions, as a springboard, I 
intend to further analyze whether roll-ups and cross-collateralization are also directly associated 
with greater levels of creditor control.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 
With such controversy over roll-up and cross-collateralization provisions, Tung has 
shown that roll-ups are not related to economic terms. However, there still remains a question if 
these provisions are products of excessive creditor control that lead to creditors having exorbitant 
influence over the reorganization process, possibly hampering a more successful and fair one. 
The act of improving the recovery of prepetition claims as an exchange for extending credit into 
the bankruptcy can be seen as a signal that DIP lenders believe in the firm’s optimistic future or 
that they are more invested in the firm’s outcome for whatever other reasons. In either case, since 
their economic profits are directly affected by the firm’s performance, DIP lenders are 
incentivized to desire greater control of the reorganization process. Thus, my hypothesis is that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1American	  Bankruptcy	  Institute.	  “Commission	  to	  Study	  the	  Reform	  of	  Chapter	  11.”	  ISBN:	  978-­‐1-­‐937651-­‐84-­‐8.	  2014,	  77.	  	  	  	  
DIP agreements with cross-collateralization or roll-up signal greater creditor control than those 
without. Consequently, my alternative hypothesis is that there is no relationship between these 
provisions and creditor control. It might be the case that cross-collateralization and roll-up 
provisions are not associated with control, but some other motivation. Perhaps, if DIP lenders 
really wanted control, they would have exerted it through other tools such as higher interest rates 
in lending terms rather than through roll-ups or cross-collateralization.  
After detailed analysis, I hope to find a definitive correlation between these provisions 
and creditor control. But if there is none, further research would be recommended to assess and 
single out other sources of motivation for the provisions.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
To measure how much creditor control these provisions signal, it is crucial to define 
specific metrics. I plan to use two measurements of creditor control: (i) CEO turnover or new 
CRO (Chief Restructuring Officer) appointed within the two years prior to filing, and (ii) 
existence and strictness of milestones and covenants. First, CEO turnover or a new CRO usually 
signals that creditors were so unhappy with the firm’s financial situation that it took extreme 
action to replace a key operational member, exerting control over the firm.  
Second, milestones or strict covenants in the DIP lending limit the debtor’s daily 
operational activities. As creditors decide on metrics such as budget limits, EBITDA targets, 
restrictions on proceeds from sales, and various financial covenants when lending, debtor has to 
comply with these terms to access financing. As creditors have immense power to curb certain 
actions and prevent potential managerial behavior that might hurt creditors’ interests, the 
existence of covenants and milestones is another strong signal.  
The dataset comprises of public company bankruptcy cases from January 2009 to 
December 2011, monitored and organized by U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
available on their website. For comparability reasons, I intend to only include cases with DIP 
lending from a prepetition lender. Then, I will split the data into two parts: those with cross-
collateralization and roll-up, and those without. For practical reasons, I will focus on companies 
with asset sizes of at least $100 million and at most $10 billion, with priorities given to cases 
from Southern District of New York (SDNY) and Delaware courts. Small companies are 
excluded due to potential lack of significance, while large companies might have too many 
confounding factors to single out the effect of roll-up and cross-collateralization. SDNY and 
Delaware courts are given priority since they are well known for their experience and expertise 
with corporate bankruptcy cases. Since most bankruptcy cases of prominence have historically 
filed with these courts, it would be useful to analyze cases from these courts to examine general 
trends as well.  
Available databases include SEC Edgar, Bloomberg, and Public Access to Court 
Electronic Records (PACER). SEC Edgar keeps all public filings of U.S. listed companies. 
Among these, 8-Ks, DIP financing disclosure documents, and credit documents are useful in 
obtaining information on specific DIP financing terms and inter-creditor agreements. Bloomberg 
is used for findings news articles about CEO or CRO of bankrupt companies, while PACER has 
court dockets that outline various stages of the reorganization process.   
For the first part of results, I intend to simply lay out exploratory findings, similar to how 
it was done by Tung in his most recent paper. By examining factors such as the frequency of DIP 
financing from a prepetition lender out of all DIP lenders, how often cross-collateralization and 
roll-up occur, the average size of claims in the dataset, and the distribution of cases among 
various states, I plan to paint a broader picture at first just to describe some general trends. 
For the second part of results, I intend to analyze the association between the existence of 
cross-collateralization or roll-up in DIP financing and two aforementioned measures of creditor 
control. The first measure of the removal of CEO or the appointment of CRO is a binary factor, 
and thus is straightforward. For example, I will seek to find out if there is a significant difference 
between the CEO removal rate from DIP lending with the provisions and the CEO removal rate 
from DIP lending without. For most statistical analysis work, I will be using the statistical 
software R and Microsoft Excel. If the statistical test reveals that there is a meaningful 
difference, then the conclusion would be that these provisions signal greater creditor control.  
The third part of the results will involve discussion of covenants and milestones. 
However, covenants and milestones are more complex because they have different levels of 
severity and strictness, which imply different levels of creditor control. Thus, I plan to first 
understand what covenants or milestones exist specific to DIP lending arrangements. Then, I 
intend to explain their severity in the context of Chapter 11, reflecting on its connection to 
excessive creditor control in the bankruptcy process.  
 
RESULTS 
Exploratory Data Analysis  
To make the analysis more meaningful, the dataset used for the purpose of this paper was 
modified from the original dataset, which is the list of all public company bankruptcy cases from 
January 2009 to December 2011, available on the SEC website. Excluding companies with asset 
sizes of $100 million or smaller, and $10 billion or bigger due to aforementioned reasons, the 
number of available companies for analysis was 107. Then, certain companies were excluded 
due to the lack of data from public sources, entries with missing or incorrect liabilities sizes, and 
duplicate entries. After the process, the new dataset had 70 entries.  
 From the new dataset, the distribution of the company’s size (based on the size of the 
assets) is illustrated below in graph 1. The distribution is skewed to the right, as mean is 876 and 
median is 500 (in millions of U.S. dollar). This explains that based on the availability of the data, 
there were many smaller companies around the size of $100-500 million than companies bigger 
than $1 billion.  
Graph 1: Distribution of Companies by Asset Size 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Asset Size Distribution 
 
Also, as illustrated in graph 2, the distribution of bankruptcy cases between 2009-2011 is 
more focused in 2009. Since the financial crisis happened in 2007-2008, many companies 
probably went into bankruptcy during and shortly after the crisis. Thus, there are many more 
companies filing for bankruptcy in 2009, decreasing by almost half in 2010, and increasing a 
little in 2011. 
Graph 2: Distribution of Companies by Year 
 
Graph 3: Distribution of Cases among States 
 
As illustrated by graph 3, Delaware and New York have the most number of cases, 
followed by Texas, and California. As many companies are either headquartered in Delaware or 
seek for bankruptcy relief in well-experienced, arguably debtor-friendly courts such as Southern 
District of New York and Delaware, these two states seem to be the most popular states to file in. 
Texas was the third popular state to file, potentially because of the prevalence of energy 
companies in the state. California was the fourth popular, probably because it is a big state with 
many companies.  
Table 2: Breakdown of All Companies 
 
Based on table 2, out of the 70 entries, 15 companies liquidated (about 21 percent) and 45 
companies (about 64 percent) received DIP lending. It seems that the existence of DIP lending 
was more common as the company size grew, because many small companies ended up in 
liquidation. It’s possible that these companies were judged to be worth too small to go through 
the restructuring process or to not have a viable business plan going forward.  
Table 3: Breakdown of Companies with DIP from Prepetition Lender  
 
Out of the 45 companies that received DIP lending, 37 (about 82 percent) had DIP 
lenders that had prepetition claims in the company. Then, as shown in table 4, out of those 37 
companies, 29 companies had either partial or full roll-up provisions in their DIP lending 
agreements. Similarly, out of the same 37 companies, 27 had cross-collateralization provisions in 
their DIP lending agreements. Considering cross-collateralization and roll-up provisions both 
serve the same purpose in that they advance the interests of DIP lenders’ prepetition claims 
possibly at the expense of other prepetition lenders, 22 companies had both provisions. 
Therefore, without the overlap, 34 out of the 37 companies had either some type of roll-up or 
cross-collateralization provisions. In other words, an impressive 92 percent of companies who 
had DIP lenders that were also prepetition lenders sought to advance their prepetition claims 
through roll-up or cross-collateralization. From this observation, it can be concluded that most, if 
not all, of the DIP lenders are greatly concerned about the recovery of their prepetition lenders 
and that they don’t hesitate to extend DIP lending with the two provisions to sweeten the deal.  
 
Statistical Analysis  
To find out if there is a meaningful relationship between CEO turnover and roll-up & 
cross-collateralization in DIP lending agreements, correlation between CEO turnover and either 
roll-up or cross-collateralization is examined.  
Table 4: Correlation between Variables 
 
 
 
 
Based on table 4, the correlation between roll-up and CEO turnover as well as the 
correlation cross-collateralization and CEO turnover are both pretty low at 0.189. Although the 
correlation is positive, it seems that the number is not very high. Also, the correlation between 
asset size and CEO turnover is negative at -0.082. This implies CEOs of bigger companies are 
slightly less likely to be removed, although the difference is very small. Perhaps DIP lenders 
even decide that if their troubled company is big and complicated, having established and 
existing leadership in place may work better than trying to shake up the whole company with a 
brand new management team.  
Table 5: CEO Turnover Rate in Different Cases 
 
In addition, there seems to be a difference between the CEO turnover rates, depending on 
whether the debtor had a roll-up/cross-collateralization or not. Based on table 5, the CEO 
turnover rate was higher at 78 percent for companies with roll-up than those without at 57 
percent. Also, the rate was higher at 74 percent with cross-collateralization than at 43 percent 
without. CEO turnover happens much more frequently when there are cross-collateralization or 
roll-up provisions. Also, the CEO turnover rate with roll-up (78 percent) was 4 percent higher 
than the turnover rate with cross-collateralization (74 percent). Similarly, the turnover rate 
without roll-up (57 percent) was 14 percent higher than the rate without cross-collateralization 
(43 percent).  
 
Analysis on Covenants and Milestones  
Since covenants are extremely individualized and complex depending on the context, it 
was difficult to quantify any particular measure. However, there were some notable findings. 
Some types of covenants were more commonly seen in DIP lending agreements with cross-
collateralization and roll-up provisions than those without. For example, it was common to see 
stricter rules laid out for the use of DIP proceeds. More specifically, the use of DIP had to be 
made with the expenditure line items set forth on a budget that the company presented to the 
lenders, which are limited to, payment of transactional fees, costs, and expenses incurred in 
connection with the DIP lending agreement.  
Also, several milestones were frequently mentioned. Specifically, the filing, solicitation, 
and approval of a plan of reorganization and approval of the related disclosure statement by a 
certain date were common. Among the more stringent ones was achieving a certain financial 
metric, such as EBITDA or revenue, or the completion of a specified sale of the debtor’s assets 
by a certain date. The last one was especially prominent in a case where the DIP lender, upon the 
violation of a milestone covenant, gained significant control of the company and sold all of the 
debtor’s assets. Thus, although it was tough to compare all covenants side-by-side in all 
companies, it appears that companies with cross-collateralization or roll-up provisions had more 
stringent covenants, sometimes deliberately unrealistic milestones, than the companies without.  
 
DISCUSSION 
My hypothesis was that having roll-up or cross-collateralization provisions in DIP 
lending arrangements signal greater creditor through having i) higher CEO turnover rates, and 
(ii) more strict covenants. First, it is clear that companies with either of the two provisions have 
higher CEO turnover rates. In general, more than 70 percent of companies with either roll-up or 
cross-collateralization appointed a new CEO. Thus, those two provisions can be a way to signal 
greater creditor control, at least exerted through the changing of CEOs. Also, although the 
difference is small, companies with roll-up recorded a higher rate of CEO turnover than those 
with cross-collateralization, which implies that roll-up is a slightly stronger signal than cross-
collateralization. The correlation between CEO turnover and both cross-collateralization and 
roll-up was both 0.189, a small positive number. Although it is small, the positive correlation 
shows that existence of cross-collateralization and roll-up is still associated with CEO turnover. 
Second, although covenants were difficult to standardize across a variety of companies, 
the findings showed existence of stricter covenants, especially of demanding milestones in an 
extreme time pressure, in DIP lending agreements with roll-up or cross-collateralization. 
Satisfying objectives such as getting a court approval of the reorganization plan, which is 
dependent on the court and not solely under the debtor’s control, in a short period of time, like 
within 30 days, is very tough if not infeasible in some cases. Moreover, budgeting line-items 
such as EBITDA, revenue, and capital expenditure are severely limiting to the debtor, increasing 
the amount of influence DIP lenders have in the restructuring process. Thus, greater creditor 
control is also manifested through more stringent covenants and milestones when DIP 
arrangements have cross-collateralization and roll-up provisions.  
Finally, there are some interesting observations that do not necessarily fit the scope of the 
hypothesis but give information on how certain bankruptcy cases with DIP financing proceed. 
Specifically, there were notable cases among the dataset where chapter 11 ended in a 363 sale, 
liquidation, or a buyout by the DIP lender who was also a prepetition lender. These cases were 
common where the lender imposed impractical milestones so that when the debtor couldn’t 
comply with them and was in technical default, the lender could seize the company and either 
sell it in a 363 sale or buy it out at a cheap price. Therefore, these proceedings could be 
expressed as other ways to exert control over the debtor.  
Overall, based on the results from the dataset used, it appears that lenders with roll-up or 
cross-collateralization clauses in their DIP lending agreement signal greater creditor control of 
the debtor by having a higher CEO turnover rate and imposing more demanding covenants.  
 
LIMITATIONS 
Several limitations to this research paper exist. First and foremost was the lack of 
information in the construction of the overall dataset. Only using information available through 
public resources and databases, finding detailed data on terms of DIP lending agreement or 
covenants, and even sometimes the CEO turnover was a difficult and time-consuming task. 
Smaller, more regional companies also do not have extensive coverage and thus are more 
challenging to find data on. Therefore, it should be noted that the paper only considers readily 
available public information and does not take into consideration private data that might have 
more insights.  
Second, the dataset may have been too small with some noise. The number of companies 
that received DIP lending from prepetition lenders was 37. When dividing those 37 companies 
into with roll-up or without roll-up and with cross-collateralization or without cross-
collateralization, the dataset size in each category decreased even more. This might have 
introduced some noise during the analysis of correlation and CEO turnover rates.  
Third, the dataset is also limited in timeframe between 2009 and 2011. This is important 
to address since the credit market then was extremely tight. Thus, creditors during that time 
might have wanted more control and wanted to secure every measure of protection possible for 
their claims. This would have introduced a bias in the findings if the creditor behavior during 
2009 to 2011 were not a true reflection of the general creditor behavior among all Chapter 11 
bankruptcy processes. However, although this might be true, creditors in any bankruptcy process 
would want to have as much protection as they can. Therefore, limiting the timeframe to 2009-
2011 might have magnified creditor concern, but probably not changed the entire direction of the 
fact that creditors would have wanted more control of the debtors when extending DIP financing.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Overall, there still remain many questions on making sure that Chapter 11 process runs 
fairly and efficiently, while maximizing economic benefits of associated parties and the future 
value of the firm. While cooperation of all stakeholders is necessary throughout the process, 
excessive creditor control, especially when it comes at the expense of others and hampers a more 
successful reorganization, should not happen. While it is extremely difficult to clearly distinguish 
the extent to which cross-collateralization or roll-up provisions are products of excessive creditor 
control or simply necessary tactics to induce creditors to extend credit, it seems that the case for 
excessive creditor control stands strong based on the findings of this paper. Bankruptcy 
professionals, as well as interested scholars in this topic would benefit from knowing the 
potential for excessive creditor control in bankruptcies with DIP financing. However, the 
findings from the paper are in no way final or definite. Therefore, given the limitations regarding 
the dataset in this paper, conducting more thorough research on similar issues with a bigger 
dataset would provide additional conviction, perhaps with the inclusion of more recent 
bankruptcies for current trends.  
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